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Abstract
Low enriched uranium samples of unknown origin were analyzed by 16 laboratories in the context of a Collaborative
Materials Exercise (CMX), organized by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG). The
purpose was to compare and prioritize nuclear forensic methods and techniques, and to evaluate attribution capabilities
among participants. This paper gives a snapshot of the gamma spectrometric capabilities of the participating laboratories
and summarizes the results achieved by gamma spectrometry.
Keywords Intercomparison  Nuclear forensics  Nondestructive assay  Gamma spectrometry  Uranium isotopic
composition  Radiochronometry
Introduction
This paper presents the state of practice in gamma spec-
trometry for nuclear forensics exercises. The Nuclear
Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG)
organized its fourth interlaboratory exercise in 2014, called
Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX-4) [1]. This paper
documents the collective experience with gamma spec-
trometry during the CMX-4 exercise and it gives a snap-
shot of the applied approaches.
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of intercepted nuclear
or other radioactive material to provide evidence for
nuclear attribution in a legal context. The goal of the
analysis is to identify the composition, origin, and intended
use of interdicted nuclear or radiological samples, con-
tainers, and transport vehicles. Nuclear forensic analysis
includes the characterization of the material and correlation
with its production history [2]. The CMX-4 represents the
second paired-comparison exercise organized to improve
international cooperation and communication in case of a
nuclear security event.
Three oxide samples of low enriched uranium (LEU)
were selected as the materials to be characterized during
the CMX-4 exercise. A scenario was included in which a
seizure of nuclear material occurred and forensic analysis
was requested. Laboratories were instructed to submit
assessment reports in a 24 h, 1 week, and 2 month time
frame. Participating laboratories categorized and charac-
terized the exercise materials, and performed nuclear
forensic evaluations. Each of the 16 participating labora-
tories was assigned a code name by the organizers to
ensure anonymity and confidentiality of data.
Among the methods used in nuclear forensics, high-
resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS) is a relatively
rapid nondestructive analytical technique. Advantages
include preservation of evidence and no, or a minimal,
need for sample preparation. A disadvantage is that it
suffers from higher uncertainty compared to destructive
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techniques, such as mass spectrometry (MS) [3]. This paper
presents the isotopic composition, age, and signatures of
the neutron irradiation history of the three LEU samples
determined by gamma spectrometry. These values are
compared to the community average values determined by
mass spectrometry.
Sample description
Participants were provided three samples of similar size
and mass: ES-1, ES-2, and ES-3. The ES-1 sample con-
sisted of a physically homogenous, fine black U-oxide
powder. ES-2 and ES-3 samples were dark gray, homo-
geneous, UO2 pellets with smooth surfaces. Representative
physical sample properties are shown in Table 1. Pellets
are made of UO2, whereas ES-1 was a mixture of UO2 and
higher U-oxides. Further details on the exercise samples
are provided in the introductory article of this Special
Section [1].
Determining major U isotopic (234U, 235U,
238U) abundances
The samples were assayed first using HRGS for the 24 h
and 1 week reports. Spectra were generally acquired by
high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors for about
30–60 min in the case of the 24 h reports, whereas much
longer measurement times were used for the 1 week
reports.
Most participants of the exercise determined the major
U isotopic (234U, 235U, and 238U) abundances using com-
puter codes [4, 5] for automatic spectrum evaluation. These
codes are based on so-called relative efficiency calibration
(or intrinsic calibration) method [6]. The relative efficiency
curve is obtained from the spectrum of the measured
sample, thus the attenuation both in the sample (self-at-
tenuation) and in absorbers (shielding) are taken into
account. Therefore, the method does not depend on the
sample size, geometry, physical, and chemical state. As all
the information for determining the isotope ratios is present
in the spectrum of the sample, no reference materials are
required for calibration. However, for quality control
purposes and for demonstrating laboratory performance, it
is recommended to use a set reference materials.
Manual evaluation also occurred, after primary pro-
cessing (measurement control, peak shape fitting, deter-
mining peak area, and deconvolution of overlapping peaks)
by codes (FitzPeaks, PeakEasy, and Gammavision), fol-
lowed by application of intrinsic self-calibration. For
example, peaks of 214Bi (for age dating) and descendants of
232U were evaluated manually.
Table 2 summarizes the gamma spectrometers and
software used for determining the isotopic composition of
the samples in the CMX-4 exercise. Only participants
sharing their results for this paper are listed. High-effi-
ciency coaxial HPGe detectors used for age dating and
identifying reprocessed uranium are not included here.
For 234U most participants obtained results that correlate
well with the average of mass spectrometric results for all
samples (Table 3). Biases fall within expanded uncertainty
(k = 2) limits, amounting to 10–20% relative uncertainty.
Older versions of MGAU tend to underestimate 234U due to
inaccuracies in the extrapolation of the intrinsic efficiency
curve to 120.9 keV [7]. Evaluation by the GAMANAL
code also resulted in unrealistically low 234U abundance.
Concerning 235U, all participants recognized the LEU
character of the samples, regardless of the detector-type
and software used. Participants found similar enrichment
values of around 2.6–2.9% for samples ES-1 and ES-3, and
2.1–2.3% for the sample ES-2 (Table 3). The majority of
values reported by participants provided a means to dif-
ferentiate ES-1 and ES-3 from ES-2, regardless of the
method used.
MGAU v4.2 results from spectra taken by a planar
detector compared very well to the average 235U enrich-
ment measured by mass spectrometry for all three samples.
The slight underestimation of the 235U content by MGAU
may come from the coincidence summing losses in the
peaks of 235U [8]. Some evaluations of spectra taken by
coaxial and broad-energy detectors resulted in significantly
higher 235U content. This could be due to coincidence
summing losses in the high-energy peaks from 234mPa,
which leads to an underestimation of the activity ratio
238U(234mPa)/235U and therefore an overestimation of 235U
[9]. The 235U enrichment estimates by the Identify software
were significantly lower than values reported by mass
spectrometry. One reason for the discrepancy could be
Table 1 Average physical
properties of the samples used
in the exercise
Sample ID Physical form Mass, g
± 0.1
Size, mm ± 0.1 Approximate isotopic abundance, mass%
Diam. Height 234U 235U 238U
ES-1 Powder 2.9 0.025 2.9 97.1
ES-2 Pellet 2.4 9.2 3.7 0.018 2.19 97.81
ES-3 Pellet 2.5 9.1 3.7 0.025 2.9 97.1
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wrong assumptions on the sample matrix, similar to what
previously was observed for low resolution measurements
[10].
Regarding 238U, mass abundances of 97.2 ± 0.1% were
reported for ES-1 and ES-3, whereas 97.8 ± 0.1% for ES-
2, in agreement with mass spectrometric results.
It can be concluded that the inventory of the three major
uranium isotopes established by HRGS generally agreed
with mass spectrometric results within expanded uncer-
tainties and confirmed the LEU character of the samples.
The accuracy was generally enough for distinguishing ES-1
and ES-3 from ES-2. Exceptions for 235U results came
from some participants using coaxial germanium detector.
Discrepancies for 234U results took place mainly for par-
ticipants using outdated computer routines [7], or effi-
ciency transfer algorithms based on point-source efficiency
calibrations instead of relative, intrinsic efficiency
calibrations.
Results of uranium isotopic abundance measurements
by gamma spectrometry and community average values by
mass spectrometry for comparison are summarized in
Table 3. The mass spectrometry average is calculated from
the data given in graphical form in the CMX-4 After-Ac-
tion report [1]. For this calculation the outliers were
removed. A three-isotope plot of the relative biases with
respect to mass spectrometry for the 234U/238U and 235U/238
isotopic ratios is shown Fig. 1.
U age dating
The model age (time elapsed since the last chemical
purification) of the material is important for determining of
the origin of nuclear material outside of regulatory control.
The daughter/parent ratio as a function of decay time is
widely used for determining the age of radioactive samples
[11, 12]. Gamma spectrometric uranium age dating is
nondestructive and suitable for relatively rapid assay. The
method does not require the use of reference materials of
known ages, nor radionuclide standards for method cali-
bration. Usually there is no need to take subsamples or
dismantle the investigated items, so preservation of evi-
dence can easily be ensured. The method works particu-
larly well for high-enriched and aged material. Its limits
appear for low-enriched material and in sensitivity to
background.
Uranium age dating by HRGS is based on the
234U ? 230Th ? 226Ra chronometer [13–19]. 234U can be
Table 2 HPGe detectors and software used by participants to determine the abundance of the major U isotopes
Lab code Detector Software
Michelangelo ORTEC Micro-Detective-HX, coaxial, diam. 50 mm, height 30 mm,
electrically cooled,
Identify
FRAM 5.1, (In-house param. set: V_CX120-
1010keV_microdetective)
Van Gogh Canberra Falcon5000, broad-energy, diam. 61.8 mm, height
31.70 mm, electrically cooled
Manual, intrinsic efficiency calibration
Monet Ortec GMX40P, coaxial, diam 63.0 mm, height 63.8 mm, electrically
cooled
FRAM 5.2, (Param. set: ULEU-coax120-1010)
Rembrandt Canberra GL0510, planar, diam. 24.8 mm, height 10 mm, active area
500 mm2
MGAU V.3.2
Renoir Canberra GL0515R, planar diam. 25.2 mm, height 15 mm, active area
500 mm2
MGAU V.4.2
Picasso For 24 h report: Canberra GL2020R, planar, diam. 50.5 mm, height
20 mm
For 1 week report: ORTEC GLP10180/07P4, planar, diam. 10 mm,
height 7 mm
MGAU V.4.2
Buonarroti Canberra GL0210R, planar,
diam. 16 mm, height 10 mm, active area 200 mm2
MGAU V.4.2
Pollock Canberra BE3820, broad-energy Ge, diam. 70 mm, height 20 mm U235 v1.51 (MGA ??)
Gauguin Ortec, coaxial (averages from different detectors were used)
GEM30P4-70: diam. 54.8 mm, height 51.0 mm
GEM-20180-S: diam. 51.0 mm, height 50.7 mm
GEM-10195: diam. 42.7 mm, height 49.0 mm
GEM-13180: diam. 4.0 mm, height 50.1 mm
GAMANAL
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detected by its 120.9 keV gamma line, whereas 230Th has
no measurable gamma rays. The next member of the 234U
decay series is 226Ra, of which the only gamma-line at
186.2 keV overlaps with 185.7 keV line of 235U. However,
its short lived descendants 214Pb and 214Bi have measure-
able gamma lines.
The time needed for secular equilibrium between 226Ra
and 214Bi is about 3 weeks, so it can be assumed that the
activities of 226Ra and 214Bi are equal at the time of the
measurement. Although we are not aware of any experi-
mental evidence that 222Rn would escape from the solid
samples, it is useful practice to hermetically seal the
samples in small containers.
For determining 214Bi activity, the intensity of the
609.3 keV gamma line (and some other 214Bi lines) can be
recorded by a large coaxial HPGe spectrometer under low-
background conditions. The same spectrum is used to
determine 238U peaks for relative efficiency. As 214Bi is a
cascade emitter, true coincidence summing losses can
cause a bias for short sample-to-detector distances, and
should preferably be corrected for. However, for larger
sample-to-detector distances the bias due to true coinci-
dence summing losses can often be neglected compared to
other sources of uncertainty.
The line of 214Pb at 352 keV does not suffer from true
coincidence summing losses. However, it is usually diffi-
cult to quantify due to its low intensity and high back-
ground continuum. Furthermore, it is far away from the
peaks which are used to construct the relative efficiency
curve, so the uncertainty of the relative efficiency at
352 keV is very high.
The 226Ra/238U activity ratio determined through mea-
suring 226Ra descendants is divided by the 234U/238U ratio
obtained during the measurement of the U isotopic com-
position. The age of the sample is then calculated from the
226Ra/234U ratio. 234U is preferentially enriched along with
235U in the enrichment process. Hence, for lower 235U
abundances, the amount of 234U (and therefore of 214Bi) is
lower as well, so the corresponding activity is more diffi-
cult to measure.
To extend the capabilities of the method, a high-effi-
ciency, 293 cm3 well-type detector was acquired by a
participant laboratory (Picasso). The first application of this
kind of detector for uranium age dating was assaying the
CMX-4 exercise samples [20]. The well-type HPGe
detector (Canberra GCW6023) was in an iron chamber of
20 cm wall thickness. A spectrum of ES-3 acquired by the
well-detector is shown in Fig. 2. Owing to their low
enrichment and age, an upper limit of & 11 years was
estimated uniformly for the three samples. This result was
consistent with the results from destructive measurements.
Ten participant laboratories employed mass spectrome-
try and alpha spectrometry for determining 234U and 230Th
in the samples [21]. One of those laboratories applied
231Pa/235U chronometer as well. Most of the measured ages
(around 10 years for ES-1 and ES-3 and around 12 years
for ES-2) were consistent with the known history of the
material.
Identification of reprocessed material
Gamma spectroscopy is useful for screening uranium
samples for fission products, and some of the actinide
Fig. 1 Relative biases with
respect to the community
average mass spectrometric
result. The bias of the mass ratio
234U/238U versus the bias of
235U/238 is shown for all three
samples. Uncertainties are
displayed with a coverage factor
of k = 1
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isotopes that would be produced by neutron activation. If
these were detected, they would indicate reprocessed ura-
nium, and also offer clues about the reprocessing tech-
nology by identifying deficiencies in the uranium
purification chemistry. No fission or activation products
were detected in the CMX-4 samples, and upper limits
reported for representative nuclides were similar between
the three samples.
The minor isotopes 236U and 232U are characteristic of
reprocessed material (or blended/contaminated with
reprocessed material) and their presence gives evidence of
previous neutron irradiation (e.g., in a reactor) of the
sample. The very low 232U concentration can be measured
by alpha- [22, 23] or gamma spectrometry [18, 24–26].
Some participants of CMX-4 detected 232U by HRGS,
using heavy shielding for low-background counting:
• Gauguin reported (5.6 ± 3.8) 9 10-11% 232U concen-
tration in ES-1, whereas the two pellets were given
upper limits as 8.8 9 10-11 and 6.3 9 10-11%.
• Vermeer identified 238, 583, and 727 keV gamma lines
of 212Pb, 208Tl, and 212Bi, respectively, (descendants of
232Th and 232U alike) in ES-1 and ES-3 samples, using
a low-background system (15 ? 5 cm Pb; the inner
5 cm layer is of a low 210Pb source), but the 911 keV
line of 228Ac (daughter of only 232Th) was missing.
Hence, it was concluded that the former did not derive
from 232Th, but rather from 232U (decay scheme of the
two nuclides is common starting from 228Th). However,
they could not find any of those lines in the ES-2 pellet.
• Picasso evaluated 208Tl, 212Bi, and 212Pb peaks in
spectra of ES-1 and ES-3 samples, in absence of 228Ac,
but no such peaks for ES-2 above background. The
2614 keV 208Tl peak was observed in the spectrum of
ES-1 (also ES-3, Fig. 2) sample, corresponding to
(6 ± 0.5)10-11% 232U concentration, but difficult to
exclude from background (& 10-11%) in the ES-2
sample. From the lack of the 911 keV line of 228Ac,
Picasso estimated a detection limit of about 10-4 for
Fig. 2 Spectrum of ES-3 (live time = 55,008 s) and of the back-
ground (live time = 65,122 s) taken by a well-type HPGe detector in
a low-background iron chamber. Both spectra are normalized to
60,000 s live time (Picasso). No surplus of the peak area of 214Bi at
609 keV was observed above background. Abundance of 232U was
evaluated from the net peak areas at 583, 860, and 2614 keV of 208Tl,
and those at 238 and 727 keV of 212Pb and 212Bi, respectively
414 Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry (2018) 315:409–416
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the 232Th/238U mass ratio with a 12 h measurement
time using the well detector.
• Buonarroti performed analysis similar to that of
Picasso, and obtained that ES-1 and ES-3 contain
(1.40 ± 0.96)10-10% and (1.20 ± 0.70)10-10% of
232U, respectively, whereas ES-2 contains less than
1 9 10-10%.
Presence of 232U in ES-1 and ES-3 indicates that the
samples were manufactured from material mixed or con-
taminated with reprocessed uranium. According to mass
spectrometric results [1], the concentration of 236U in both
samples is about 0.0020 ± 0.0004% on average, but near
the detection limit in ES-2 (B 10-4). This confirms the
conclusion from HRGS that ES-1 and ES-2 contained some
reprocessed material, while ES-2 did not.
236U cannot be analyzed in LEU by gamma spectrom-
etry, only in extremely high-enriched (weapons-grade)
material [13], because its peaks are masked by the much
stronger peaks from the major U isotopes (e.g., the stron-
gest, but still quite weak 49.369 keV line of 236U lies very
near the 49.55 keV line of 238U.) Thus, 236U abundances
were only quantified by mass spectrometry.
A correlation between the 236U and 232U contents exists.
According to Picasso’s results, the 236U/232U abundance
ratio was & 3 9 107 in the ES-1 and ES-3 samples. This
value is in agreement with earlier results [18, 24, 26] on U
samples over the full range of enrichments, from LEU to
the highest enriched (90%) uranium, and is in accordance
with theoretical predictions [27].
It is not clear where the reprocessed U in samples ES-1
and ES-3 comes from. All the three samples were made in
the same factory (fictitious ‘‘EA Fuel Products’’ or virtually
HIFAR [1]) and from natural U. If they got contaminated
with reprocessed U in the enrichment plant, all three should
contain traces of 236U and 232U, unless the facility became
contaminated between processing the two source materials
A and B.
Conclusions
For identifying the provenance of unknown nuclear mate-
rial, information on the isotopic composition, the age, and
previous neutron irradiation of the material is relevant. In
addition to previous exercises when weapon grade mate-
rials were examined, this exercise confirmed that gamma
spectrometry also plays a significant role for the analysis of
LEU in the comprehensive response to these issues.
Results of this exercise confirmed that LEU can be
categorized as such via gamma spectrometry within 24 h,
regardless of the detector, software, and calibration
methodology. For accurate determination of isotope ratios,
the best results were acquired with planar HPGe detectors
and current versions of the MGAU and U235 software. The
utility of high-efficiency HPGe detectors in low-back-
ground setup was demonstrated for detecting trace 232U,
thus indicating contamination with reprocessed U. Chal-
lenges related to the age dating of low-enriched and young
aged uranium (difficulty with determination of lower
amounts of 214Bi) were identified.
The combination of different analytical techniques
increases the confidence in the results and can help further
narrow down the set of possible origins and intended uses
of the examined materials.
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